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Abstract: 
The REDD+ readiness phase leading up to implementation has been slow and has fallen short of expectations. 
In this article, we present REDD+ experiences from Indonesia and Vietnam with a focus on the readiness 
phase, examining policy processes at the central, provincial and local levels. Interviews with key stakeholders 
(officials, donors, NGOs, village representatives)  and data from household surveys suggest that efforts have 
been concentrated at the central level, with the provincial level mainly feeding data into the process and the 
local level practically left to its own devices. Furthermore, the REDD+ design may be misguided as it exempts 
the major stakeholders, namely the state and private enterprises, from declaring emissions sub-targets in 
the national carbon reduction action plans, and focuses exclusively on rural forest dwellers who struggle to 
understand the ideas that underpin REDD+.  
Keywords: REDD+, environmental governance, stakeholders, tree cover  
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1. Introduction  
For several years, REDD+ (Reduction of Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation) was considered a 
supplementary measure at the COP (Conference of Parties) meetings,  but it is now regarded as a major 
mitigation instrument in global climate change policies, having worked its way into the final document at the 
COP 21 meeting in Paris (UNFCC, 2015 Deforestation and forest degradation account for an estimated 15% 
of global anthropogenic CO2 emissions, although estimates vary greatly due to uncertain FAO estimates of 
global deforestation rates (van der Werf et al., 2009; Baccini et al., 2012). The original idea to create a facility 
to reduce carbon emissions through compensation for reducing deforestation rates came from low-income 
countries (Financial Times, 2005). Other mitigation measures, like energy-saving investments, are clearly 
required in both of these countries. But here we focus on REDD+ implementation, and specifically on the 
readiness phase.   
Starting in 2007/2008, the Parties or countries voluntarily undertook programs to reduce emissions from 
deforestation. Successive COP meetings employed the word ‘encourage’ when addressing REDD+ (see for 
example UNFCC, 2011), but in the 2015 Paris agreement the wording changed to ‘Parties should take action’. 
The Paris agreement urged developed countries to finance both mitigation and adaptation strategies in 
developing countries to the tune of USD 100 billion annually (UNFCC, 2015). 
REDD+ is a mechanism that commits developed and developing countries to reducing carbon emissions, as 
discussed at international level in COP meetings (Brockhaus et al., 2014; Matthews et al., 2014). Global 
governance frames the conditions for all REDD+ countries, but the achievement of REDD+ goals requires the 
formulation of carbon reduction-inducing policies at the national level. 
The UN and the World Bank are responsible for the most comprehensive programs, from policy framing to 
local activities, and they are the most significant organizations through which donor funds are channelled.. 
Norway stands out as the leading donor, together with the USA and Germany, with these countries providing 
approximately $1 billion each out of a total REDD+ financial envelope of approximately $10 billion (Norman 
& Nakhooda 2014/2015). Countries have used these funds for the preparation of REDD+ (i.e. the readiness 
phase). However, no country has yet reached this stage, with Vietnam being a possible exception (see 
discussion later on  
In 2008, the UN-REDD program prepared a framework document for six REDD+ pilot countries, which 
outlined a time frame of 18 months from the availability of donor payments until entry into the international 
carbon market (UN-REDD, 2008). The World Bank designed a funding window called the Forest Carbon 
Partnership Facility (FCPF), and its first annual report concluded that the first year was one of ‘tremendous 
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progress’, since the number of REDD+ program countries increased from 14 to 37 (FCPF, 2009: 1). In 2016, 
the most notable achievement was that Costa Rica and the Democratic Republic of Congo succeeded in 
moving to the implementation phase (FCPF, 2016a). Importantly, the UN-REDD measured the success of 
REDD+ in the partner countries according to the completion of reports on national forest inventories, action 
plans and reference emission levels, and not actual REDD+ activities on the ground (UN-REDD, 2015a).  
We evaluate the REDD+ political process by studying the readiness phase in Indonesia and Vietnam through 
the activities of the two main programs. Vietnam was among the original 14 REDD+ countries both within 
the UN and the WB framework (Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF), 2009), and during the first years of 
REDD+ until 2015, both organizations heralded Vietnam as a genuine success story (FCPF, 2009, UN-REDD, 
2015b and FCPF, 2015). Since 2016, however, there has been less publicity about progress in Vietnam. 
Indonesia has received 19% of total pledged or allocated global REDD+ funding from donors (Norman M. & 
Nakhooda S. (2014/2015), p. 23). Indonesia is a crucial country in the REDD+ framework because of its forest 
size, and FCPF annual reports document reforms of decentralization and the ‘One Map Policy’ (FCPF 2015, 
2016a). We will return to the ‘One Map Policy’ later.  
This paperaims to analyzes REDD+ performance in Indonesia and Vietnam from 2010-2017 and discusses the 
extent to which REDD+ efforts have stabilized or reduced deforestation rates in case study areas and/or 
achieved the overall objectives of the REDD+ program.  So far, the REDD+ readiness phase lacks clear 
objectives, and we therefore propose a new evaluation framework, which we consider a suitable basis for 
policy development analyses. The paper examines the core REDD+ elements and asks whether the two 
governments have taken steps to apply them in drafting new forest policies (see below, including table 2). 
 
The readiness phase objectives for Indonesia and Vietnam differ slightly in wording, but are largely similar in 
substance, both in terms of policies and outputs. In Indonesia, objectives have focused on strengthening 
institutional goals: ‘setting up national readiness management arrangements’ (FCPF, 2016a) or 
‘strengthen[ing] multi-stakeholder participation and successful demonstration of establishing an REL 
(Reference Emission Level), MRV (Monitoring, Reporting and Verification) and a fair payment system’ (UN-
REDD, 2009:6). In Vietnam, ‘the objective is to support Vietnam to become ready for future REDD+ 
implementation’ (FCPF, 2016b) or ‘to enhance Vietnam’s ability to benefit from future results-based 
payments for REDD+ and undertake transformational changes in the forestry sector’ (UN-REDD, 2013:11). 
The formulation of goals and expected outcomes was more specific for Indonesia than for Vietnam, where 
documents mainly addressed outcomes. 
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Financial, social and institutional barriers often constitute the direct causes of shortcomings in policy 
implementation. Here, we confine our analysis to assessing tangible outputs of the readiness phase or lack 
thereof.  As evident in the literature, scholars face challenges in their attempts to define success when it 
comes to the REDD+ readiness phase. Svarstad and Benjaminsen (2017) claim that organizations are 
concerned with marketing success narratives, even though the gaps between claims and evidence are 
apparent. Other authors list criteria to achieve success, such as the formation of coalitions to promote a new 
agenda (Brockhaus et al. 2014), the creation of appropriate incentives (Streck, 2012) or the establishment of 
government super-bodies  (Purnomo et al., 2012).   
2. REDD+ expectations 
No recipes or standards – not to mention concrete results - are available to gauge the success of REDD+ policy 
outcomes. We argue that most REDD+ literature addresses only a single aspect, e.g. monitoring issues or the 
formulation of a benefit-sharing mechanism, and therefore misses the bigger picture, i.e. the national 
performance of REDD+ programs. A notable exception to this is Matthews et al. (2014) who concentrate on 
potential policy instruments and the quantification of impacts, whereas we contemplate the links between 
the national, provincial and local levels in two countries.  
In the readiness phase, we expect countries to define the core REDD+ elements: 1) identify the main 
deforestation drivers, 2) determine the REL (Reference Level, base year carbon emissions), 3) develop and 
implement MRV (Monitoring, Reporting and Valuation) procedures, 4) engage in multi-actor negotiations, 5) 
develop and implement benefit-sharing schemes, and 6) ratify and adhere to social safeguards. We consider 
the core REDD+ elements necessary to reach the implementation phase.  
In the implementation phase, reduction of deforestation will occur if the core REDD+ elements are defined 
in operational terms and implemented. We selected these core REDD+ design elements based on readings 
of REDD+ global reports (UN-REDD, 2010 and FCPF, 2016).  
3. Theory: Environmental governance 
From the late 1980s onwards, the failure of state-controlled international regimes in the environmental 
management of natural resources (declining fish stocks, ocean acidification, species extinction and climate 
change, see Walker et al., 2009) prompted a new international approach, namely the introduction of global 
governance and the joint development of required instruments and mechanisms. Increasingly, NGOs and 
multinational actors participated in meetings and influenced global decisions (Lemos and Agrawal, 2006). A 
crucial argument for promoting such global solutions is the need to address transboundary environmental 
issues like climate change. States often do not have sufficient resources and capacity to address such issues 
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alone, and therefore reach out to communities or international institutions to find solutions at the 
appropriate scale. Recent resentment from the US regarding the non-binding Paris agreement on carbon 
emission targets demonstrates the problem of national sovereignty versus multilateral, scientific, and more 
reliable ‘imposed’ goals. The slow and not yet confirmed shift away from state-controlled environmental 
management to market-based instruments, ecotaxes, voluntary agreements and subsidies, preceded the 
global embrace of carbon credit trading, which is partly linked to the CDM (Clean Development Mechanism) 
in developing countries. Initially, it was thought that once REDD+ reached the implementation phase, it would 
be partly funded by the private sector (FCPF, 2011). 
The main weakness in global environmental governance is the absence of adequate instruments for putting 
multilateral agreements into action (i.e. there are no sanctions for non-compliance and no guarantee of 
compensation). Multi-stakeholder partnerships are failing to live up to their promises (Pattberg and 
Widerberg, 2015). Often, transnational arrangements do not measure environmental goals as such, but 
instead use voluntarily disclosed information as a proxy for effectiveness. The Forest Stewardship Council, 
the Carbon Disclosure Project and the C40 Cities Climate Leadership are examples of information serving as 
a project end goal, according to Pattberg and Widerberg (2015). Multi-stakeholder governance may not close 
the legitimacy gap in the eyes of civil society if the government ignores public concerns, and the inclusion of 
more partners (private sector, NGOs) does not automatically lead to greater effectiveness. The overall 
objective in multi-stakeholder arrangements becomes a choice between accommodating participatory and 
social legitimacy concerns or leaning towards a display of effectiveness with a firm focus on ecological or 
economic goals, thereby becoming less participatory (Taylor and Cheng, 2012). These authors suggest 
including an embeddedness approach, such that success or failure are judged using alternative criteria such 
as the contribution to human regional development or the environment. 
After evaluating 150+ projects executed by the World Bank, Buntaine and Parks (2013) formulated, amongst 
others, two hypotheses pertinent to our analysis: 1) The more global the objectives (such as “reducing climate 
change” or “protecting biodiversity”), the less likely it is that positive outcomes will result. 2) Projects with a 
greater emphasis on environmental funding compared to development objectives generally achieve poorer 
results. In the statistical test, only the first hypothesis proved significant and was thus accepted. 
REDD+ fits into this category of donor-driven projects with very broad and global objectives. Miller (2014) 
suggests that large countries hosting important biodiversity resources are likely to accept global projects only 
if they are coupled to additional funding for development purposes. 
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3.1   Environmental governance and REDD+ 
A review of scholarly work reveals how debates about REDD+, global environmental governance and the 
scope of these initiatives have changed over time.  Caplow et al. (2011) reviewed projects aimed at achieving 
carbon emissions reductions that were introduced before REDD+ was conceived. Most of the projects lacked 
baseline data and general rigour in terms of objectives and monitoring tools. Caplow et al. were specifically 
concerned about the absence of counterfactuals for impact evaluation in these projects. At the beginning of 
the REDD+ readiness period, more observers were optimistic about the potential outcomes. Observers 
initially concluded that international civil society, businesses and local communities were concerned about 
forest rights and investment security, and that this increased the odds of ending up with good governance 
and REDD+ legitimacy (Lederer, 2011). Moreover, REDD+ strategies were seen as potentially able to combine 
the mitigation of carbon emissions, poverty reduction for millions of poor people, and the promotion of 
biodiversity conservation (Hayes and Persha, 2010).   
A couple of years later, the optimism had slowly begun to evaporate, and today observers tend to underline 
the challenges inherent in REDD+. Concerns have emerged about how to specify the drivers of deforestation, 
define forest services, and reach a better understanding of existing benefit-sharing schemes such as Payment 
for Ecosystem Services (Matthews et al. 2014). Without a proper actor analysis at the national level that 
includes the agents responsible for deforestation, carbon emission reductions are unlikely to materialize 
(Brockhaus et al., 2014). A global-national-local focus, rather than an emphasis on international REDD+ 
debates alone, will facilitate what the authors call the ‘institutionalization of discourse for transformational 
change’. For example, a performance-based economic mechanism at the national level might turn out to be 
inapplicable at the provincial or local level, where preferences for fair distribution predominate (Matthews 
et al., 2014). In a survey covering seven REDD+ countries, policy makers, business managers and NGOs 
answered questions about REDD+ objectives, monitoring and funding options.  The results indicated that 
REDD+ strategies could converge towards the carbonization of forest (disregarding safeguards and 
biodiversity benefits), technicalization and centralization of the process (Vijge et al., 2016). Finally, the 
question of marketization favouring a higher degree of private sector involvement remains unsolved, due to 
uncertainties about whether the private sector will show an interest in REDD+. Furthermore, lack of good 
governance and administrative capacity could neutralize any achievements in the establishment of a well-
functioning MRV system (Ochieng et al., 2016). REDD+ programs furthermore fall short in terms of addressing 
the drivers of deforestation; training courses in REDD+ countries are ad hoc and of poor quality; and little 
attention is paid to making REDD+ functional at the subnational level (Minang et al., 2014).  
7 
 
Scholars have examined the REDD+ process in Peru in several papers which served as additional inspiration 
for our approach. Robiglio et al. (2014) assess the political process and argue that shortcomings exist in areas 
of cross-sectoral stakeholder dialogue, limited understanding of deforestation drivers, and lack of integration 
of REDD+ policies in national and regional plans. The two first shortcomings are similar to observations we 
made in Indonesia and Vietnam, and add to the impression that the REDD+ design is often difficult to 
implement to the letter. White (2014) contrasts two approaches in the indigenous people’s rights guarantee 
in the REDD+ framework, namely a safeguard-based REDD+ perspective and a rights-based approach 
underlining local control of all forest goods and services. If the land tenure conflicts were solved, illegal use 
of forest resources would decrease. Land tenure conflicts are common in our two countries of study. 
 
4. Methods and data 
 
We consulted government officials at national, province, district and commune levels, as well as donors and 
NGOs working with REDD+ activities in Indonesia (Jakarta and Berau in eastern Kalimantan) and in Vietnam 
(Hanoi, Lam Dong and Lao Cai provinces). Conducting research in Vietnam requires that official introduction 
meetings are first conducted at all administrative levels of the People’s Committee, and at the central level - 
in this case the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MARD) in Hanoi. In the People’s Committee 
meetings, approximately 10-15 officials participated, though only 2-3 of them expressed their views. In 
Indonesia, rules are less strict but official visits added to our qualitative understanding of the REDD+ 
framework in this country. Our objective was to obtain diverse perspectives about the REDD+ framework in 
both countries. In Indonesia we visited two ministries, two embassies, FCPF, CIFOR, a research institution, 
and the WWF (an international NGO). At the provincial level, we held meetings with the forest service, the 
provincial council on climate change, and the University of Tanjung Para. At the district level, we met with 
the forest service, the district REDD+ secretariat, TNC (The Nature Conservancy), three Indonesian NGOs, and 
GIZ. In Vietnam, meetings were held with one ministry, several NGOs (international and Vietnamese), two 
embassies, JICA, a USAID-supported program, UN-REDD, FCPF, and two universities. At the provincial and 
district levels we visited the People’s Committee, and at the commune level we met with village leaders. Our 
discussions with these informants raised questions about stakeholders’ understanding of, and perceptions 
about, progress in REDD+ activities orchestrated primarily by the UN-REDD and the World Bank.  
Authorities both in Indonesia and Vietnam assisted us in selecting provinces and districts where the UN-REDD 
and World Bank FCPF are pursuing preliminary REDD+ activities. In Indonesia, we visited the province of 
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eastern Kalimantan, Berau district (four villages). TNC (The Nature Conservancy) and the District Government 
oversee the REDD+ programmes with the clear aim of involving FCPF at least in the benefit-sharing schemes. 
However, the benefit-sharing project never materialized.  In collaboration with Bogor Agricultural University, 
we selected the study villages. In Vietnam, we collected data in central Vietnam (Lam Dong province, one 
village in each of three districts) and North Vietnam (Lao Cai province, one village in each of three districts). 
In Indonesia, all REDD+ activities are now concentrated on the island of Kalimantan, mostly in eastern 
Kalimantan.  In Vietnam, Lam Dong belongs to the first round of REDD+ provinces, and Lao Cai to the second 
round. In collaboration with Hanoi Agricultural University in the case of Lao Cai, and UN-REDD office in Da 
Lat (Lam Dong), we selected the districts/villages in Lam Dong and Lao Cai. 
Figure 1 shows the location of the sites and Table 1 shows the number of households in the survey. They are 
all REDD+ sites. Approximately 10% of the households were selected randomly in each village.  
 
Figure 1 Maps showing locations of the study villages in A: Lao Cai Province, Vietnam; B: Lam Dong Province, 
Vietnam; and C: Berau Regency, Indonesia. Map source: The GADM database, downloaded from DIVA-GIS 
(http://www.diva-gis.org). 
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Table 1 Number of households in study sites 
Province District Commune Village Number of 
households 
Lam Dong, Vietnam Lam Ha Phu Song R’teng 2 101 
Di Linh Bao Thuan KaLaTanGu 106 
 Lac Duong Da Nhim DaChay 8 
Lao Cai, Vietnam Bao Thang Ban Cam Nam Chu and Ban 
Lot (commune name 
used) 
23 
 Bao Yen Xuan Hoa Ban Qua 1 and 2, Ban 
Bon, Goc Lu 
(commune name 
used) 
60 
Long Khanh Ban 1 and 2 
(commune name 
used) 
55 
Eastern Kalimantan, 
Indonesia 
Berau Kelay Merabu 49 
Long Duhung 24 
Merapun 86 
Berau Gunung Tabur Birang 41 
Total 7 8 15 553 
 
Source: Household survey, April 2016, August 2016 and April 2017 
 
We evaluated the REDD+ activities at the national, provincial and commune levels and assessed the success 
of existing REDD+ activities based on the concretization of actions required to reach the objectives of the 
REDD+ readiness phase.  
We adopted a two-stage approach.  First, we explored how far Indonesia and Vietnam have progressed in 
terms of achieving core REDD+ design elements. The analysis was based on official documents published by 
the two governments and insights from discussions with key stakeholders. Our main analytical tool was to 
question stakeholders on the progress of the six core elements, and to consult central government or 
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provincial documents to ascertain how far the countries had come in reaching operationalization based on 
pilot tests. Core REDD+ design elements lacking clear definition, which had not yet been tested, or for which 
government approval was still pending, were considered unsuccessful. In no document did we find a 
distinction between objectives in the readiness phase and implementation goals. 
Second, we used a household survey (individual households) to evaluate local communities’ knowledge and 
perceptions about REDD+. Here, we concentrated on three questions:  how do you understand REDD+; is 
crop farming legal under the REDD+ regime; and do you fear that outsiders will receive the money in a future 
REDD+ benefit-sharing scheme?  Finally,  we examined changes in forest cover around the study villages, 
based on data from Global Forest Watch (Hansen et al. 2013). 
 
5.  Results and discussion 
 
5.1 National level 
The UN-REDD began operating in 2009 both in Indonesia and Vietnam (UN-REDD, 2010). In Indonesia, the 
government, through the national REDD+ agency, reported the establishment of a national emissions 
reference level, progress in the formulation of an MRV system, and the concretization of a national benefit-
sharing mechanism (World Bank, 2011; Republic of Indonesia, 2014). Today, the Directorate General of 
Climate Change under the Ministry of Environment and Forestry is in charge of REDD+ implementation and 
policies (P3SEKPI, 2017). The most notable policy intervention is the government’s declaration of a 
moratorium on forest conversion in 2013, which is still in force. The government issued an MRV design 
document in 2015 and suggested that existing forest management units should oversee community 
involvement in REDD+ (Republic of Indonesia, 2015). However, a survey of 41 forest management units 
revealed that only 20% have completed any forest management plans (Bae et al., 2014). By contrast, Kim et 
al. (2016) found signs of improved forest governance, based on a case study. These authors suggest that to 
be fully operational, government policies should be more consistent and committed to strengthening the 
capacity of individual forest management units. No published document addresses the last requirement, i.e. 
government measures to promote a multi-stakeholder approach in forest policy formulation. Norway 
promised to transfer 1 billion $ US if REDD+ initiatives were to pay off in terms of lower or falling 
deforestation rates, but in reality the Norwegian government hesitated to get involved in what they 
characterized as ‘a bumpy journey’ in Indonesia. To date, Norway has only disbursed approximately 8% of its 
pledged funds to Indonesia (Norwegian embassy, personal communication).  
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In Vietnam, The Emission Reductions Program funded by the FCPF notes that the REDD+ program will be the 
first all-encompassing intervention in six provinces in Vietnam (Republic of Vietnam, 2016a). However, it is 
often overlooked that the first disbursement by the World Bank was in 2012. The year 2016 marked the 
Vietnamese government’s official recognition that the REDD+ process has been far from smooth. The 
government failed to implement a national benefit-sharing mechanism, and with no monitoring system in 
place or a functional MRV, Vietnam completed an emission reductions report for the World Bank REDD+ 
system in 2016 (Republic of Vietnam, 2016a), requesting a financing package of $50 million from the Carbon 
Fund (phase II). A technical assessment report raised several concerns that needed to be addressed before 
Vietnam could qualify for additional REDD+ funding. In particular, matching appropriate interventions to the 
drivers of deforestation remains unresolved, and the transformation of forest into plantation continues 
apace (FCPF, 2016). A single but significantly positive sign appears in the World Bank’s technical assessment 
of the revised version, however. The World Bank revised assessment underlines technical improvements 
(consistency between the reference level and monitoring), better description of safeguards, and the 
expression of political will to lower the conversion of natural forests into plantations (FCPF, 2017). The 
Carbon Fund accepted the application from the Vietnamese government in 2018 (FCPF, 2018).  
Table 2 summarizes progress in development of the core REDD+ elements during the readiness phase. An 
REL has been established in Vietnam based on the testing and development of maps, although FCPF 
inconsistencies with the MRV call for improvement and maybe a need to shift to another REL period (Republic 
of Vietnam, 2018; FCPF, 2018). By the same token, the FCPF found progress in the MRV system satisfactory. 
In both cases, REL and MRV, the Vietnamese government will have to endorse the technical framework. 
Likewise, although deforestation drivers were identified in all six provinces, no methodological section 
explains the ranking system used to identify the main drivers (Republic of Vietnam, 2018). In Indonesia, REL 
is in place, and MRV are being further developed in a number of projects with a view to improving the 
methodology. Progress is very slow in all other areas of core REDD+ elements (Republic of Indonesia, 2018). 
We interviewed several NGOs in the two countries, and they were neither involved nor consulted in the REL-
MRV processes, nor in identifying the deforestation drivers.  
The REDD+ process has been in the making for 7-8 years, and both countries have made little progress, with 
Indonesia falling behind even compared to Vietnam. The less technical pillars, social safeguards and multi-
actor negotiations, are apparently the most difficult issues for the two governments to address. 
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Table 2: Summary of progress in the core REDD+  elements, Indonesia and Vietnam, 2018 (national level) 
 
Source:   
Republic of Indonesia. (2018). Emission Reductions Program Document (ER-PD). Jakarta, 
Indonesia. 
Republic of Vietnam, Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (2018). Emission Reductions 
Program Document (ER-PD) 
 
 
 
 
Core  REDD+ 
elements 
 Indonesia Vietnam Comment, 
Indonesia 
Comment, 
Vietnam 
Identification of 
deforestation 
drivers 
No reference to 
deforestation 
drivers 
Main 
deforestation 
drivers identified 
 Official 
acknowledgement 
of deforestation 
being an issue. Link 
to REDD+ policies 
is not clear.  
REL (Reference 
Emission Level) 
Finalized in 2017 REL to be approved 
by government 
Link to MRV not 
yet established 
No time window 
for government 
endorsement 
MRV Principles 
developed in 2016. 
Training of staff is 
ongoing 
Principles 
developed over 
the years. 
Requires 
government 
approval 
Not implemented 
anywhere in 
Indonesia 
No time window 
for  government 
endorsement 
Multi-actor 
negotiations 
Public 
consultations only 
Stakeholders at 
the household 
level involved in 
consultation. 
Less attention to 
this issue than in 
Vietnam 
Not clear how 
households and 
communities will 
get involved in 
forest 
management 
planning (FMP) 
Benefit-sharing 
mechanisms 
No trial anywhere  No trial anywhere   
Social safeguards Not yet addressed Issue addressed, 
including 
customary rights. 
 Not clear how 
safeguards will 
affect FMP  
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5.2 Provincial level 
Experiences in REDD+ projects on the ground in Indonesia vary more than in Vietnam. The Indonesian 
government allowed many actors to design their own implementation models, and we would therefore 
expect that a wider range of ideas would have been tested. Based on information from other analyses of 
REDD+ projects and our own investigation in four villages, the end result is surprisingly similar, however. 
Often, if not always, REDD+ projects had shifted from their core objective to reduce emissions in the future, 
to a focus on multi-stakeholder interaction that emphasizes reconciling opposing user preferences when it 
comes to the exploitation of forest resources. In socioeconomic settings where conflicts had been simmering 
for a long time, the arrival of the REDD+ projects had little to offer. In one NGO-managed project in central 
Kalimantan (Hawson and Kindon, 2015) and another in eastern Kalimantan (our field area), local villagers 
were unable to influence the provincial administration in what they saw as dubious deals with developers. 
Villagers joined the REDD+ project either because it gave them access to financial capital (central 
Kalimantan), or because they succeeded in persuading the NGO in question to act as a mediator in forest 
rights conflicts (eastern Kalimantan). In other projects, REDD+ readiness activities came to a halt due to local 
resistance, because villagers feared they could lose their land as a result of a survey of existing boundaries. 
Examples were an Australian-funded project in Central Kalimantan (Agung et al., 2014 and Howell, 2015), 
and a review of a UN-REDD project in Central Sulawesi (Howell, 2015). Today, REDD+ projects are practically 
all concentrated on Kalimantan and are funded by the FCPF or the German government (FORCLIME, 2013). 
Problems with forest management in eastern Kalimantan centre on conflicts over access to land. REDD+ 
programs will have to broaden the inclusion of stakeholders, and include foreign mining or logging firms, in 
order to solve these conflicts. In general, in REDD+ programs relationships are currently only designed to 
articulate between the global level (donors), the government and the local people (FCPF, 2008 and 2017). 
We are not familiar with any REDD+ program that allows the voice of large corporations to modify the general 
picture of a REDD+ program (interviews with German and Japanese project leaders) 
The overall objectives in the planning process are defined at the provincial level, with little power left to the 
district level. A pervasive problem is a provincial-level policy of granting concessions to economic activities, 
whether related to mining, logging or palm oil plantations. Sunderlin et al. (2014) identified various factors 
favoring or undermining REDD+ projects at the local level, one of which is that the national and local levels 
often issue overlapping forest licenses. If a new provincial policy aims to curb emissions and conserve the 
forest, companies often request compensation. A review article on the REDD+ debate characterized the 
benefit-sharing theme as crucial and compared it with the opportunity costs of land (Mbatu, 2016). The value 
of alternative uses of land (foregone benefits) compared to actual carbon prices on world markets is often 
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used as a proxy for conservation costs in Indonesia (for example Terauchi, 2014 and Resosudarmo et al., 
2014). However, these authors underestimate the real opportunity or conservation costs that would be 
incurred if the potential compensation were paid to foreign exploitation firms instead of to local farmers. 
Land allocation is firmly underway in Indonesia, although there are challenges in the form of disputes over 
land tenure between local people, the state and enterprises. As a result of the continuous struggle for land 
and land disputes, overlapping maps probably exist in most of rural Indonesia (Kunz et al., 2017).  The former 
REDD+ Agency suggested introducing a One Map Policy to make up for the absence of a single reference 
system that could be used by all ministries (Wilbowo and Giessen, 2015). The One Map Policy is technically 
feasible but any application is likely to face political obstacles due to different interests among the ministries, 
as noted by the authors. In 2018, the government finalized the mapping of the last three islands (The Jakarta 
Post, 2018). 
Vietnam presents a different case, as the state controls or seeks to control all forestry activities in the country. 
The UN-REDD has suggested initiating and monitoring forest activities in six provinces, and the World Bank 
concentrates its activities in another five provinces (UN-REDD, 2013; FCPF, 2017). In Vietnam, the 
Department of Agriculture and Rural Development issued a provincial REDD+ report (for Lam Dong 
province) in 2014 (PRAP), containing an analysis of carbon emissions drivers and scenarios regarding the 
possible effects of government interventions in the forestry sector (DARD, 2014). However, the report 
omitted any discussion of the lack of concrete local activities in the province, and engaged in a lengthy 
presentation of various benefit-sharing schemes, steering clear of any reference to the de facto situation in 
Lam Dong. Later, data collection and preliminary analyses of forest drivers in five other provinces fed into 
the Vietnamese government’s ER-PD (Emission Reduction Program Document) to support a request for 
further funding from the World Bank (Republic of Vietnam, 2016a). Here, it appeared that the provinces 
acted more as service providers than active stakeholders in policy framing in Vietnam. The offices we visited 
in Lam Dong and Lao Cai had not organized any formal meetings with the villagers. Brockhaus et al. (2014) 
describe approaches like those applied in the Lam Dong provincial REDD+ report as ‘the business-as-usual 
approach (BAU)’, characterized by not directly defending policies leading to deforestation, but ignoring 
domestic factors and focusing exclusively on securing external funding.  
The UN-REDD office in Lam Dong (Vietnam) is the only province to have issued a regional document (DARD, 
2014). The provincial action plan estimates carbon emissions and outlines a number of scenarios based on 
more or less reduction in forest conversion. Ideas to develop MRV principles and adopt them in the province 
are presented in the report. Several NGOs in Vietnam mentioned provinces’ complaints that few funds 
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filtered down to the provincial level, and in the provincial meetings staff observed that they did not receive 
any additional payments for services provided within the REDD+ framework.  
 
5.3 Commune level 
We examined REDD+ local activities in the two countries and posed villagers similar questions about basic 
economic characteristics and their attitudes towards REDD+. Initially, we sought to compare people’s 
strategies before and after donors or local authorities had experimented with REDD+ benefit-sharing 
schemes or had explained to locals about their forest rights under REDD+. However, in none of the sites we 
visited had REDD+ activities taken off yet. The UN-REDD office in Hanoi claimed that the agency was taking 
steps to implement local activities in Lam Dong from 2016.  Most activities included support for local people, 
consisting of clothes and fertilizer. While beneficial to the locals any link to REDD+ objectives was absent, 
such as benefit sharing, involvement of stakeholders, or the ultimate goal to slow down deforestation rates. 
Pilot REDD+ forests in Lam Dong province (Vietnam) are marginal in size (100-300 hectares) and build on 
existing and relatively well-functioning forest protection schemes. Apart from the identification of target 
forest areas in the two countries, we found no monitoring of forest cover over time or assessment of 
household compliance with rules (rules are often only explained verbally).   
In the household survey, we first asked villagers how they understood REDD+ regulations. Most villagers in 
the two provinces in Vietnam were familiar with the forest protection provision in REDD+, but correct 
response rates were significantly lower in Indonesia (Table 3). Regarding the question of whether farming 
inside forests was permitted under REDD+ regulations, there were substantial differences in responses. In 
only two out of a total of 9 villages (R’teng 2 in Vietnam and Merabu in Indonesia) did a majority of the 
population recognize correctly that crop farming is not allowed inside REDD+ assigned forests (Table 4) Forest 
protection in these two villages existed well before any discussion about REDD+ was put on the agenda. 
In a future scenario with payments for carbon rights or forest protection, villagers were requested to answer 
whether they thought outsiders would receive the money. Villagers in Vietnam were clearly more concerned 
about outside seizure of their rights to compensation (Table 5).  
Few villagers, regardless of province and country, can claim legal tenure on forest areas. Almost none of the 
500+ households we interviewed could demonstrate ownership of forest plots in the form of a deed or red 
book certificate (Vietnam). In both countries, forest areas belong to the state, and forest land allocation is 
characterized by the prevalence of concessions to the state or private companies. Local REDD+ activities in 
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the villages have virtually no bearing on the impact of REDD+ policies as long as de facto national forest issues 
are negotiated between governments and state/private companies.  While the tenure situation regarding 
land other than dwellings is uncertain in both countries, we know from interviews that conflicts exist in both 
countries between households and the state or private companies. We did not embark on a specific analysis 
of deforestation drivers, but the fact that we noticed conflicts between locals and companies (state and 
private) in all sites suggests who/what could be the main deforestation drivers.  
Benefit-sharing schemes and social safeguards require local experience and involvement, but neither of the 
two main international organisations, the UN-REDD or the FCPF, arranged meetings or discussed these issues 
with locals in either of the two countries. Only JICA (Japanese International Cooperation Agency) piloted 
benefit distribution schemes in the northern province of Dien Bien during the project period (JICA, 2015). 
 
Table 3 How do you understand REDD+? Household data from Vietnam and Indonesia 
 
 Lam Dong, Vietnam Lao Cai, Vietnam Kalimantan, Indonesia  
How do you understand 
REDD? DaChay KaLaTanGu 
R'teng 
2 
Ban 
Cam 
Long 
Khanh 
Xuan 
Hoa Merabu 
Long 
Duhung Merapun Birang Total 
Control of forest 0 
0.00 
1 
1.0 
1 
1.0 
   0 
0.00 
2 
8.3 
8 
9.3 
0 
0.00 
12 
Don't know 7 
87.5 
25 
23.8 
35 
34.7 
10 
43.5 
12 
21.8 
31 
52.5 
26 
53.1 
13 
54.2 
36 
41.9 
30 
73.2 
225 
Forest protection 1 
12.5 
78 
74.3 
59 
58.4 
11 
47.8 
38 
69.1 
26 
44.1 
19 
38.8 
9 
37.5 
39 
45.4 
8 
19.5 
288 
Compensation for forest 
protection 
0 
0 
1 
1.0 
6 
5.9 
2 
8.7 
5 
9.1 
2 
3.4 
3 
6.1 
0 
0 
1 
1.2 
1 
2.4 
21 
Total 8 105 101 23 55 59 48 24 84 39 546 
Source: Household survey, April 2016, August 2016 and April 2017 (figures in brackets indicate percentage 
of total) 
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Table 4  Is crop farming legal or not under REDD+?  Household data from Vietnam and Indonesia 
 Lam Dong, Vietnam Lao Cai, Vietnam Kalimantan, Indonesia  
Is crop farming legal or not 
under REDD+? DaChay KaLaTanGu 
R'teng 
2 
Ban 
Cam 
Long 
Khanh 
Xuan 
Hoa Merabu 
Long 
Duhung Merapun Birang Total 
Not allowed 1 57 
57.6 
72 
90.0 
8 
34.8 
18 
32.7 
18 
30.0 
15 
53.6 
1 
12.5 
20 
24.1 
7 
22.6 
217 
Allowed partly 0 4 
4.0 
2 
2.5 
2 
8.70 
7 
12.7 
10 
16.7 
2 
7.1 
1 
12.5 
1 
1.2 
3 
10.0 
32 
Allowed freely 4 
50.0 
1 
1.0 
0 
 
8 
34.78 
21 
38.2 
16 
26.7 
    46 
Don’t know 1 37 
37.4 
6 
7.5 
5 
21.74 
9 
16.4 
16 
26.67 
6 
21.4 
5 
62.5 
38 
45.8 
10 
32.3 
132 
Don’t understand 2 
25.0 
     5 
17.9 
1 
12.50 
24 
28.9 
11 
35.45 
41 
Total 8 99 80 23 55 60 28 8 83 31 475 
Source: Household survey, April 2016, August 2016 and April 2017 (figures in brackets indicate percentage 
of total) 
Table 5   Are you afraid that outsiders will receive the money and not you? Household data from Vietnam 
and Indonesia 
Source: Household survey, April 2016, August 2016 and April 2017 (figures in brackets indicate percentage 
of total) 
 Lam Dong, Vietnam Lao Cai, Vietnam Kalimantan, Indonesia  
Are you afraid that outsiders 
will receive the money and not 
you? DaChay KaLaTanGu 
R'teng 
2 
Ban 
Cam 
Long 
Khanh 
Xuan 
Hoa Merabu 
Long 
Duhung Merapun Birang Total 
No 4 
50.0 
66 
62.3 
65 
64.34 
12 
52.2 
36 
65.5 
35 
58.3 
40 
81.6 
21 
87.5 
85 
98.8 
29 
70.7 
389 
Yes 0 16 
15.1 
13 
12.9 
5 
21.7 
10 
18.2 
10 
16.7 
4 
8.2 
0 
0 
1 
1.2 
8 
19.5 
67 
Don’t know 4 
50.0 
24 
22.6 
23 
22.8 
6 
26.1 
9 
16.4 
15 
25. 
5 
10.2 
3 
12.5 
0 
0 
4 
9.8 
89 
Total 8 106 101 23 55 60 49 24 86 41 553 
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5.4     Tree cover changes at sites 
Tree cover in 2000 was much higher in the Indonesian sites (e.g. lowest at 84% in Birang and approximately 
97% in Merabu, Merapun and Long Duhung at 50% tree canopy density; Fig. 2 than in the Vietnamese sites 
(although it was 80% in Da Chay and 66-71% in Ban 1 and 2, Long Khan commune). In all locations apart from 
Kalatangu, tree cover was higher in 2000 than in 2010, irrespective of the applied tree canopy density 
threshold. Comparing the period 2001-2013 to the period 2013-2016 - roughly equivalent to before and after 
implementation of REDD+ pilot projects in the two countries - the loss of tree-covered area per year increased 
slightly in Merabu but declined in Birang, Indonesia (0.34→1.38 and 3.4→2.09% at 50% tree canopy density 
(see Fig. 3). In the later period, the loss per year of areas with more than 50% tree canopy density remained 
low in R’ Teng 2 and Kalatangu (0.32 and 0.05%), declined in Qua 1 and 2 (0.16→0.06%) but increased in Ban 
1 and 2, Vietnam (0.16→0.70 and 0.16→0.66%). Applying a definition of 75% canopy density reduces the 
tree cover change (2000-2010) by 7-10% points in the middle range sites (Xuan Hoa and Nam Chu in Vietnam) 
and increases the change in areas experiencing high deforestation rates  (Merabu in Indonesia and Da Chay 
in Vietnam). In most other sites, using another tree canopy cover definition does not change the picture very 
much. 
 Figures 2 and 3 also enable comparison of changes in tree cover in the applied 5 km radius around villages, 
with change in a 10 km radius (filled and open circles on the bars). In most cases, Figure 1 reveals higher 
forest cover beyond the 5 km radius in both 2000 and 2010, and a lower percent of annual loss both in 2001-
2013 and 2014-2016, suggesting that the 5 km radius quite accurately reflects villages’ sphere of influence, 
although potential overlaps with areas around neighbouring villages are not considered. The few exceptions 
include Ban 1 and 2 in Vietnam, with lower average tree cover in the 10 km radius than the 5 km radius in 
both 2000 and 2010, and higher percent annual loss in 2014-2016. In Indonesia, tree cover was slightly lower 
in the 10 km radius which, for 2010, may be explained by a plantation spreading fom the west starting in 
2008-9 (Google Earth historical maps). This may also explain the higher percentage of annual loss in Merabu 
in the period 2001-2013, while for Birang the continued expansion since the 1990s of mining and logging 
concessions may explain the higher percentage annual loss in the 10 km radius.      
Because the UN and the World Bank never initiated real local REDD+ activities and, if anything, only partially 
focused on forest monitoring, and because most of the forest was outside the reach of REDD+ policy 
interventions anyway, the continuing loss of forest in these sites cannot be ascribed to policy failures within 
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a REDD+ framework. However, the data show that two sites in Indonesia (Merabu and Long Duhun) fared 
quite well in forest protection. In both villages, forest protection preceded the idea of REDD+. Conflicts are 
more open in Long Duhun, and the NGO ‘The Nature Conservancy’ seeks to mediate between the villagers 
and the local mining and logging firms. In Long Duhung, households were very reliant on access to forest 
products. A threat from a neighboring palm oil plantation could change the relative calm in Merabu in the 
future.  Another issue is that forest quality in terms of forest coverage is higher or much higher in Indonesia 
compared to Vietnam (Figure 2). 
 
 
Figure 2 Per cent forest in 2000 and 2010, expressed as land with at least 50% tree cover within 5 km radius (vertical 
bars) and 10 km (circles) around each village. Source: Global Forest Watch (https://www.globalforestwatch.org). 
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Figure 3 Annual loss of forest (land with at least 50% tree cover) within a 5 km radius (vertical bars) and 10 
km (circles) around each village, calculated for 2001-2013 and 2013-2016 and expressed as per cent of land 
area. Source: Global Forest Watch (https://www.globalforestwatch.org). 
 
6.  Conclusions  
Our analysis reveals two possible explanations for the failure in the REDD+ readiness phase in Indonesia and 
Vietnam. For a long time – six to seven years in fact - international objectives for capacity building have placed 
a strong emphasis on procedural policy tools, such as the development of steering committees, training and 
outreach, which were often treated as end goals in themselves. Of the six core REDD+ elements, Indonesia 
has defined an REL and is in the process of defining an MRV. Vietnam has both an REL and an MRV ready for 
final government approval, although it has not provided any time window for endorsement. The main 
deforestation drivers have been identified in Vietnam, however the government has yet to supply 
information about the ranking system (methodology). The three remaining core REDD+ elements: multi-actor 
negotiations, benefit-sharing mechanisms, and social safeguards are hardly discussed or if a document does 
raise the issue (social safeguards in Vietnam) the connection to other core elements lacks clarification. 
Qualitative information, mainly from interviews with NGOs, confirms this impression. 
The primary goals of stopping deforestation and promoting transparent governance appear to have been 
overlooked in the frantic race to reach the implementation phase. External and independent monitoring 
might have addressed the main issues, but the question is whether the REDD+ track record is so poor already 
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that no optimism can be mustered to save the model. Donors and multilateral organizations were eager to 
get the readiness process launched in 2010/2011 shortly after the COP meeting in 2009, where REDD+ made 
it to the final document (UNFCC, 2010). The objectives of the readiness phase were never clearly specified or 
linked to the final objectives of REDD+ during the implementation phase, namely curbing carbon emissions 
by lowering the deforestation and degradation process.  
Seen from a global perspective, there is a tendency towards more critical assessments of the feasibility of 
REDD+. That said, analyses often differ in terms of scale and definition of the type of challenges involved. To 
some observers, the challenges are of a technical nature. International organizations should resolve technical 
obstacles, such as the representativeness of projects, in order to enable upscaling to the national level, and 
should also address leakage issues and how to reach climate efficiency (Fischer et al., 2016).   
Another school of observers looks beyond issues of measurement and addresses forest definitions, classifying 
forest in remote areas as ‘degraded’ or low productivity forest. This, in turn, justifies the wholesale clearing 
of secondary and even primary forest and conversion for plantation purposes (Barr and Sayer, 2012). Both in 
Indonesia and Vietnam, forest officials used the term ‘low productivity’ forest. Others have spoken of 
‘conservation fads’ and referred to REDD+ as a discursive commodity at ‘a moment in time when we cannot 
afford to waste financial resources on hot air’ (Lund et al., 2016: 134).                       
We argue, conversely, that the main problem is not technical issues or conservation fads, but the contrast 
between the global governance model and the national political reality. Political will to address deforestation 
drivers is crucial if REDD+ national policies are to stand a chance of succeeding. In Vietnam, political 
preoccupation with gaining international approval and faith in the government’s sincerity have increased 
during the REDD+ readiness phase, whereas Indonesia shows little sign of modifying its initial business-as-
usual approach. Vietnam attained endorsement from the World Bank to benefit from the Carbon Fund’s 
financial resources. Provinces are supposed to deliver studies to the central government on deforestation 
drivers and forest types in order to calibrate potential carbon sequestration (Republic of Vietnam, 2017). 
However, the provinces acted more as service providers than key agents in shaping the readiness phase. In 
Indonesia, REDD+ activities are all concentrated on one island (Kalimantan), and coordination between the 
central and regional levels is no longer essential. An obvious reason for this concentration could be past 
decentralization and coordination issues, as we discussed above. The FCPF is the only major REDD+ 
international institution, and monitoring has become easier due to this move to regional and donor 
concentration. However, nobody in Indonesia seems concerned about scaling up aspects of the Kalimantan 
experience, if the case study should one day prove successful. Local REDD+ activities are almost absent in 
both countries. 
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Findings regarding local perceptions of REDD+ activities were discussed with the UN-REDD in Hanoi, and 
representatives here acknowledged shortcomings but claimed that enhanced future efforts by the UN would 
rectify the situation. When the authorities in both countries, at the central or provincial level, did recognize 
challenges with REDD+ and conceded or accepted criticism of slow progress in reaching the implementation 
phase, they insisted that it had to do with complex UN-REDD budgetary procedures and overly restrictive 
conditions for disbursements.  
If REDD+ ever reaches the implementation stage, donors will have to address the issue of mistrust in Vietnam. 
In both countries, approximately 70% of villagers prefer to own their forest lot, and in many cases, villagers 
see this as an opportunity to increase their area of agricultural land. In general, local villagers in both 
countries were totally unacquainted with the implications of the REDD+ program. They did not entirely 
oppose the idea of forest protection, e.g. in Indonesia 44% of the villagers were in favor of protection. 
However, in general respondents expressed uneasiness with the official system (both countries) and the risk 
of outsiders grabbing their land (Vietnam). If the pilot programs are representative of the UN-REDD campaign 
capacity, the result does not allow for much optimism. Only in R’teng 2 in Lam Dong province in Vietnam did 
the majority of the local population know about forest protection and the ban on agriculture in the protected 
forests, and felt reasonably confident that their forest would not end up in the hands of outsiders. 
A focus on poor forest dwellers (FCPF, 2008 and 2017) in the design of REDD+ rules out all the major 
stakeholders, i.e. state/private logging firms and mining companies, from declaring emissions targets in 
national carbon reduction action plans. National emission reductions programs risk falling short of the Paris 
agreement targets (intended nationally determined contributions, INDC) if the actual deforestation drivers 
(state and private companies) are not addressed and the currently high deforestation rates continue. 
According to the Indonesian government, 63% of the country’s emissions stem from land use changes, and 
the government has pledged to reduce emissions by 26% against a business-as-usual scenario by 2020 
(Republic of Indonesia, 2016). In the case of Vietnam, the government has presented two strategies – for a  
decrease in emission intensity (energy consumption per GDP unit) and an increase in forest cover - resulting 
in a reduction of 8% against a business-as-usual scenario in 2030 (Republic of Vietnam, 2016b). In both 
countries, the REDD+ governance design is ill-suited to curbing carbon emissions that occur outside the 
control of small forest dwellers.  
In both Indonesia and Vietnam, the readiness phase emphasized policy framing with few concrete and 
painstaking measures identified to meet the INDC that the two countries reported at the Paris COP meeting. 
None of the main REDD+ pillars - drivers of deforestation, REL, MRV,  multi-actor negotiation, benefit-sharing 
schemes, social safeguards or on the ground experiences with REDD+ at the local level - have yet been fully 
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addressed and operationalized. Of the two countries, Indonesia seems the least likely to muster the political 
will to change the business-as-usual approach enshrined in the national strategy, which puts economic and 
social development first and climate change second. Only the coming years will demonstrate whether the 
Vietnamese government’s seeming new commitment is backed up by action or whether what we are 
witnessing is mere lip service rather than concrete climate-friendly action. Many of the required actions from 
the Vietnamese government fall naturally within a readiness phase framework. However, the World Bank 
has allowed the preparatory work (readiness phase related activities) to continue into the implementation 
phase. 
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